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Why since at least two decades macroeconomic policies have
been so active in the US and so passive in Europe? I contend that
social norms have changed and that the new norms call for a greater
degree of inequality. Then macroeconomic policies have to be active
in the United States and passive in Europe. The change in the social
norm was mainly led by the new generation of elites born after WW2
educated in a context where individual successes were more affected
to individuals than to the collective action which has contributed
to build the public goods they have benefited from.
1. - Prolegomena: The European Macroeconomic Policy Puzzle
The theme of this lecture came out as an effort to understand
the difference in economic policy strategies on both sides of the
Atlantic. Why since at least two decades macroeconomic policies
have been so active in the US and so passive in Europe? Why
governments in Europe do accept rather passively a persistent
high level of unemployment? What explains their apparent
resignation to a slow growth trend? Is there a fundamental
difference in institutions that can explain such a prolonged
difference in growth performance? My answer to these questions
has varied through time.
In the 1980s I developed with Edmund Phelps (Fitoussi and
Phelps, 1988) an explanation of the slump in Europe. The radical
change of the US policy mix in the first half of the eighties led to
a large increase in both the world long term interest rate and the
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* <fitoussi@ofce.sciences-po.fr>.real exchange rate of the dollar; for the European countries this
magnified the inflationary consequences of the second oil shock
and forced a tighter monetary policy. The interest rate and the
exchange rate channel of the transmission mechanism dominated
the trade channel and as a result the expansion in the United
States did not lift the European rate of growth.
In the 1990s the story was not quite the same. The American
policy mix was reversed — expansionary monetary policy and
(weakly) restrictive fiscal policy — and it was no more possible to
refer to an external shock to explain the poor European performance
in terms of growth as well as in term of unemployment. But an
internal shock, German unification, played the same role, as it led
in Germany to an expansionary fiscal policy and a monetary
restriction. The only important difference was that the inflation
situation was not at all the same at the beginning of the eighties
and at the beginning of the nineties. By and large, the battle against
inflation had been won in the preceding decade, and the German
unification shock should not have led to such an increase in the
restrictivity of monetary policy in non German countries of the
European Union. One has to recall that the average short term real
rate of interest in the EU during the period 1991-1996 was about
5% for an average rate of growth of 1.5%: the critical gap was thus
as high as 3.5%, which by historical standard is extraordinary high.
We  have thus to refer to a complementary phenomena to explain
the course of macroeconomic policy in Europe during the nineties,
namely the deflationary bias of decentralised monetary union
(Fitoussi and Flandreau, 1994). A partial proof of this assertion is
that this deflationary bias came to an end with the launching of the
euro. Moreover an alternative explanation of the high level of
interest rates during this period does not exist. 
When it comes to the current decade the passivity of
European economic policy facing a series of adverse shocks needs
a complementary explanation. The main suspect this time is
institutional: the missions and structure of the European
government. Monetary policy is in the hands of an independent
federal agency whose only mandate fixed by an international
treaty is to keep price stability. It is important to underline that
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means and goal and is not accountable to any political institution.
It has thus no legitimacy to react to shocks but those which affect
the current and expected inflation rate. In such a setting it is no
wonder that the responsibility of exchange rate policy is all but
clear and relies de facto on the ECB. When it comes to fiscal policy,
the picture is even gloomier, as it is in the hands of twelve national
authorities, constrained by the Stability and Growth Pact. In a
nutshell the structure of power is such in Europe that those
institutions which have the instruments to react have not the
legitimacy to do so while those which have the legitimacy have
no more the instruments. Hence the passivity of European policy
reaction.
So far so good. The naïve could nevertheless have something
to object: “the story for each decade seems to be convincing. You
can always refer to an exogenous factor — different from decade
to decade — to explain the poor performance of the European
economy; but how to make sense of the fact that economic policies
are consistently wrong in Europe and consistently right in the
US?”. And indeed the naïve is right: how to make sense of that?  
I have no articulated answer to that query. I will rather use
a working hypothesis which may be put in the following way:
assume that over the past decades social norms have changed and
that the new norms call for a greater degree of inequality. Then
macroeconomic policies have to be active where this higher degree
of inequality has been achieved — in the United States — and
passive where it has not, so as to achieve it. That is admittedly a
crude way of putting the hypothesis, but as we shall see later it
may be arrived at in a more sophisticated way. It is not a
conspiracy theory. A change in social norm may have deep roots
and be the reflection of a collective belief to which policy makers
may find hard to resist. It may come from the achievement of
democracy itself, which by freeing people may lead to more
individualistic behaviour. It may also come from a change in the
doctrinal credo of the European elites: After WW2, the then
existing elites fell into disrepute for obvious reasons, and most of
them were changed. The new generation had a strong sense of the
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smooth functioning of a market economy as their memory of the
thirties were still vivid. John R. Hicks (1982) explained the succes
of the “French model of the mix economy” in the sixties by the
coming into power of this new class of elites. Because of the very
success of the strategies they have lead (the golden thirty, i.e. the
huge increase in per capita income in Europe) those beliefs
progressively faded under the doctrinal influence of the theory of
the market economy. The change in the social norm was mainly
led by the new-new generation of elites born after WW2 and
educated in a context where individual successes and personal
merit were more affected to individuals than to the collective
action which has contributed to build the public goods they have
benefited from. To understand the consequence of a change in
social norm some theoretical reflections are in order. 
2. - Social Norms and Inequality: Theoretical Notes
In what follows, I will try to demonstrate how a change in
social norm leading to a more individualistic evaluation of the
workers (i.e. changing the weight between the evaluation of the
productivity of a team and the productivity of the workers
composing a team) may lead to a greater degree of inequality
between the workers.
I will first use a completely individualistic framework, the
theory of a pure market economy, to show how a collective action
imposed through law may mitigate the degree of inequality achieved
spontaneously. I will then show how a social norm may substitute
for this collective action through an implicit system of subsidies
between workers. Eventually I will study the consequence of the
ending of this social convention, what will happen if it is no more
obeyed.
If we reason in the framework of a competitive general equi-
librium model, full employment is achieved when the wage dis-
tribution corresponds to the distribution of marginal productivi-
ties of labour. Shocks on relative marginal productivities of labour
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isation on the demand for low skilled labour, the non-neutrality
of technical progress — have the effect of widening the distribu-
tion of wages, i.e. of increasing inequality in countries where such
an increase is allowed for, say in the US. In countries charac-
terised by a generous social protection system such an adjustment
may be prevented. For example, the level and the duration of un-
employment benefits may raise the reservation wage. Besides,
minimum wage legislation may cause workers whose marginal
product is valued less than the minimum wage to be permanent-
ly unemployed.
Under these circumstances a trade-off can arise between
wages and employment when the demand for unskilled workers
falls. This trade-off seems to be well grounded in General
Equilibrium Theory. However in such a framework, absent heroic
assumptions on endowments, redistributive schemes have to be
devised to obtain equilibrium wages above (social) subsistence level.
Minimum wage cum unemployment benefits and/or minimum
income is an example of such a scheme. Dehez and Fitoussi (1996,
1997) present a general equilibrium model with different
categories of labour, each characterised by an inelastic supply and
a specific level of productivity; they study the effect on em-
ployment and wages of introducing a minimum real income, while
prices and nominal wages are otherwise perfectly flexible.
Compensations are paid to unemployed workers and financed by
an income tax. Together with the minimum real income, this
induces a minimum real wage. The fact that individuals differ in
terms of their skill is an important feature of the model. The
distribution of skills is relatively rigid in the short term because
the acquisition of new skills takes time. However there is always
a certain degree of flexibility because workers are often qualified
for a variety of jobs. Skill and qualification are thus distinguished:
the skill structure is rather rigid while the qualification structure
offers some flexibility. This flexibility is allowed for by assuming
that the structure of qualifications is pyramidal in the sense that
workers with a given skill are qualified for jobs corresponding to
lower skill levels.
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is given in real terms. The emerging wage scale is such that wages
in two successive categories are equal whenever unemployment
prevails in the most qualified type
1. The equilibrium distribution of
employment may be characterised by under-employment because
some workers may have to accept jobs corresponding to lower
qualifications. It is then shown that the existence of a (short run)
equilibrium depends on the capacity of the economy to finance the
unemployment compensations from income taxes, without the
creation of money.
Alternative institutional arrangements, like employment
subsidies, perform better in such a framework. Firms receive a
subsidy such that workers in category j cost their marginal
productivity, even if they receive a net real wage equal to the
minimum income. In this setting, there is full employment and
the authors show that it is actually possible to cover the subsidies
from taxes. The employment subsidies regime is thus compatible
with full employment and a balanced budget under minimal
assumptions. Full employment can be obtained through a wage
subsidy scheme if, and only if, the minimum net income of the
wage earner is strictly less than the weighted average of marginal
productivities. However, it may also be explicitly imposed through
taxation if the high skilled workers do not reduce their supply of
labour — as assumed in that model — because of the increased
taxation. In effect, the scheme has the consequence of narrowing
the after tax wage distribution relatively to the productivity
distribution.
To  sum up, the introduction of a wage subsidy scheme will
have two effects: in a country characterised by a relatively high
level of the minimum wage (say France), it will “force” full
employment, because the “high” minimum wage perceived by the
worker is greater than the cost of labour paid by firms. In a
country were the minimum wage is not binding but the problem
arises from a too high level of the reservation wage — which
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1 See FITOUSSI J.P. (1994) for a comparative study on wage distributions in
United States, United Kingdom and France.amounts to saying that the wage effectively paid to the less skilled
is too low — it will lead to an increase in the net real wage
perceived by the workers and thus reduce the propensity to quit
of these workers. In both situations, it will lead to an increase of
in-work benefits.
But individual marginal productivities are hard to measure as
most productions are arrived at through team working. For this
reason, there is some arbitrary element in assigning to each
member of a team a given figure for his productivity and thus for
his wage. In other words wage distribution is also arrived at
through social norms. For example, in the preceding case, the full
employment solution may be spontaneously achieved if social
norms impose a wage structure such that the degree of inequality
in the wage distribution is smaller than the degree of inequality of
marginal productivities. Social norms may impose such implicit
systems of subsidies (from workers with a high level of productivity
to workers at the low end of the productivity scale). 
But it is the converse case that we want to study. Assume then
that the primum movens of the change in wage distribution, and
more generally, income distribution, is neither globalisation nor
technical progress, but a change in attitude in society towards
inequality. In 1992 I showed how a greater tolerance towards
inequality is likely to lead to mounting unemployment in
European countries (Fitoussi, 1992). It is easy to understand the
reasons if we use the preceding framework. This change in attitude
can be seen as an exogenous shock — every thing being equal —
on the wage distribution, which becomes wider to the point that
say the minimum wage becomes again binding (leading to
unemployment) and/or to the point were the system of subsidies
becomes unfeasible (leading to a burst in the degree of inequality).
One may even think to the case were the new social norm leads
to a wage distribution wider than the distribution of marginal
productivities (“the winner takes it almost all”). In this latter case
full employment can still be sustained if relative wages adapt to
the new social norms. Otherwise unemployment will increase
among the workers at the lower end of the wage distribution. In
effect to meet this change reverse subsidies are called for — from
Macroeconomic Policies and Institutions J.P. FITOUSSI
15the poor to the rich — to avoid adverse consequences on
employment. It is as if low skilled workers accept a real wage
lower than their marginal product to allow high skilled workers
to get real wages higher than their marginal product. Admittedly
this is an extreme case. But even if we consider the general case
were the new social norms calls for a widening of the wage
distribution, it implies on impact reverse subsidies vis à vis the
former. In countries where the social protection system does not
allow for such reverse subsidies — because say of a “too” high
level of the minimum wage — unemployment will increase. Of
course, to avoid such an outcome a fiscal scheme may be devised
— to subsidize the employment of these workers — as in the
preceding model, but it will unlikely be financed by high wage
workers; the impossibility to cover subsidies with tax receipts will
thus lead to budget deficits. In effect the high skilled workers are
asking for an increase in their net income, and for this reason
will oppose an increase in income taxes. (Fiscal and social
competition between European countries becomes the common
wisdom through which they legitimate their behaviour). The
employment subsidies regime becomes thus incompatible with full
employment and a balanced budget. Notice that the change in
social norms has in this case the effect of increasing the NAIRU.
In such an environment, macroeconomic policies (in a very strict
regime of inflation targeting at a very low rate) become ineffective
to combat unemployment and the situation seems to call clearly
for “structural reforms”. I will come back to this point later.
Is there evidence of a change in social norms? Actually there
is. The country where this change seems to have worked all its
way is the United States. Paul Krugman (2002) clarifies the
concept: since 1975, the average annual salary in America
increased by 10%. Over the same period the average annual
compensation of the top 100 CEOs went from 39 to 1000 times
the pay of an average worker. Between 1979 and 1997, the after
— tax income of the top 1% family rose 157% compared with
only a 10% gain for families near the middle of the income
distribution. It is no wonder then that the share of the rich is no
longer trivial: the top 1% receives nowadays 14% of after-tax
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which is now about as large as the share of the bottom 40% of
the population. “And here is a radical thought: if the rich gets
more, that leaves less for everyone else” (Krugman, 2002). The
usual explanations — globalization, skill-biased technology, or
“the superstar” explanation — cannot help to understand an
increase in inequality of such a magnitude. Income seems to have
evolved out of relation with any measure of productivity. “The
more pessimistic view — which I find more plausible — is that
competition for talent is a minor factor. Yes a great executive can
make a big difference — but those huge pay packages have been
going as often as not to executives whose performance is
mediocre at best.” (ibid.).
3. - The Effectiveness of Macroeconomic Policies
3.1 - Macroeconomic Policies and Social Norms
Against this background, the difference in the use of
macroeconomic policies between the United States and Europe
may be more easily understood. Macroeconomic policies have to
be active where the social protection system is weak or
equivalently where the degree of inequality has reached the level
required by the new social norms. Otherwise a slowdown of
growth, not to say a recession, would have such far reaching
consequences, that it would endanger the legitimacy of the
economic system. Mass unemployment in the US is simply
unbearable in view of its potentially destructive social
consequences. (To fix ideas, life expectancy is in the US three years
lower than in Sweden; infant mortality twice as high. The median
Swedish family has a standard of living roughly comparable with
that of the median US family, but Swedish families with children
which are at the 10th percentile have income 60% higher than
their US counterpart).
In Europe macroeconomic policies may be passive, or even
structurally restrictive, as the social protection system can take
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slow growth path of the economy will put the social protection
system and public finance under pressure, as fiscal and social
receipts will slowdown at the very moment where social
expenditures are increasing.
The responsibility of bad macroeconomic management in the
soft growth regime which characterises Europe since at least
fifteen years has for long been recognized: the abnormally high
level of real interest rates in the nineties, the procyclical evolution
of the real exchange rate, the absence of reactions of fiscal policy
to the succession of shocks in the present decade, etc. So absent
macroeconomic policies and growth policies, the only apparent
way out would then be structural reforms, a leaner welfare state
and a lower level of public spending. The course of European
macroeconomic policies can be seen as a way to force structural
reforms so as to achieve the required increase in inequality.
European economies would need greater labour flexibility and this
in turn would imply the reduction of the artificially introduced
imperfections that hamper its free and efficient functioning.
Among these institutional obstacles the most frequently named
ones are the minimum wage, unemployment benefits, employment
protection, and more generally a labour market legislation which
imposes structural rigidities. The conclusion seems clear: our
society can keep its level of affluence and full employment can be
reached by making workers depend more on low-pay precarious
jobs. 
Regardless of the theoretical justification of the Welfare State
whose function should be that of alleviating the inefficiencies
resulting from the real-world market failures, it is undeniable that
the European experience has shown how welfare programs
increase the size of governments: the need of larger revenues to
finance various programs may lead to increase the magnitude of
tax distortions. In the presence of lasting soft growth periods
welfare programs may lead to a mounting public debt and/or to
increased taxation of labour income. The welfare state may then
be considered as unsustainable in times of unemployment because
it leads to an increase in the cost of labour at the very moment
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of adjustment fall on the social protection system, restrictive
macroeconomic policy show its effectiveness, once its implicit goal
of increasing the degree of inequality — i.e. to adapt to the new
social norm — has been recognized.
3.2. - The Mechanics of Active Decentralised Structural Reforms in a
Space Characterized by Rules Oriented Macroeconomic Policies
Notice that the same story can be told in a different, less
awkward way. One of the main justifications of the European
construction is to build a big economy so as to benefit from the
fruit of a single, large market. But to arrive at such an outcome,
member States have agreed to obey to rules designed to safeguard
the public good “financial stability”. In so doing they have
collectively accepted to at least partially sterilize the instruments
for managing a big economy, i.e. monetary policy and fiscal policy
without speaking of exchange rate policy and industrial policy. Is
it a pure chance if among the big countries of the OECD, the euro
area is the one wich has the smallest (consolidated) budget deficit
and the lower growth rate? But if the “European government” is
constrained by rules, national governments have to find their way
to alleviate the burden of shocks on their citizens.
In principle in a common currency area where exchange rates
are irrevocably fixed, relative deflation translate one for one into
real depreciation. Price and wage flexibility may thus be very
effective for a country wich is subject to a contractionary demand
shock. In a large unified market any single country comes close
to being a text-book small economy whose price elasticity of
exports is very large. Hence a modicum of relative deflation could
translate into a large gain in net export. Admittedly this kind of
adjustment may have adverse effect on the net export of other
countries, which could be tolerated if it is a reaction to a specific
shock hurting a given country. But what if the whole area is
subject to a contractionary demand shock? For reasons already
mentioned (the one-sided mandate of the ECB, the Stability Pact),
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national governments cannot stay passive when confronted to
mounting unemployment. But their capacity to react is severely
limited as they have no more at their disposal the instruments of
macro policies. They are left with only one strategy, namely
competitive disinflation which implies structural reforms, i.e. a
partial dismantling of the social protection system and of labour
protection. In the context of a common contractionary shock, this
type of national strategies will obviously lead to much more
perversities than in the context of a specific shock. When cross-
border effects and likely policy responses are taken into account
they will most probably be destabilizing. Even more, the fiction
of Europe being a collection of textbook small open economies
cannot be pushed too far. Some are much bigger than others (i.e.
Germany versus Ireland) which imply that the payoff of real
depreciation is unevenly distributed. To say the same thing
differently, for a given shock the size of the real depreciation
needed is much bigger for Italy than for, say Denmark. This
amounts to recognize that if it is rational and profitable for a
small economy to play small, it is nor rational, nor profitable for
a big economy to do the same. It should not come as a surprise
then if when we look at the European Union we get the impression
that small countries are doing much better than big ones. There
are certainly lessons to be learnt in observing the Danish way, but
for France, Germany or Italy, it will far from suffice to import the
Danish model!
The conclusion is simple: the European separation model –
federal monetary policy and federal rules constraining national
fiscal policies on the one hand and “unconstrained” national
structural policies on the other – leads to an uncooperative game
whose outcomes are a soft growth path and an increase in the
degree of inequalities. Absent an active macroeconomic policy at
the European level, each country whatever its size has the
incentive of using the instruments of a small economy, or is
constrained to do so, faute de mieux. It is as if the aim of building
a big economy was conditional on the giving up of the instruments
necessary to rule a big economy! 
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In what precedes I advanced a strong and provocative
hypothesis: the inertia of European governments in the past
decades is due to a “hidden agenda”, namely the tentative to bring
the European social system to a lower degree of protection, and
hence to prove the ineluctability of structural reforms. These, in
turn, should push Europe towards the situation required by the
new social norms. But wouldn’t it be more straightforward, and
more intuitive, to admit that structural reforms simply smoothen
the working of the economy, and hence are conducive to higher
growth and welfare for all? After all the NAIRU could have
increased as a consequence of the inadaptation of the social
system to a new environment — the thesis of the interaction
between shocks and institutions — rather than as a consequence
of an exogenous move in the desired wage distribution.
Independently of the truth of this diagnosis itself, I want to
emphasize that the need for structural reform is not an excuse for
bad macroeconomic policies! One may even argue the contrary:
the more needed are structural reform, the smartest should be the
policy mix. Otherwise the cost to present generations of the
adaptation to the new social protection system would be so high
that it will entail the political capital of the government. The cost
of the mounting conflicts in the economy would add up to the
one associated with bad macroeconomic management producing
an even slower growth path.
The reference model, in the plea for structural reforms, is
centred on an economy with perfect competition and rational
expectations. In such a model full employment is always assured
absent rigidities, and policy is ineffective. This framework
emphasizes the role of institutions in economic performance,
especially labour market institutions: any rigidity leads to
departures from the reference model and hence to bad economic
outcomes. Redistributive schemes may be devised, as shown
before, but up to a point only, when they enter into conflict with
work incentive.
This vision has two major (and related) flaws: The first,
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welfare theorems, by which a perfectly competitive market will
always reach the most efficient price/quantity allocation. It is
simplistic because the step from the theoretical result to the
policy prescription is wider than one could think, and has to be
taken cautiously (as was done by the founders of general
equilibrium theory). In fact, the efficiency of the market outcome
strongly depends on a number of assumptions that are rarely
observed in the real world, from perfect competition to complete
markets and information. At any rate, even assuming that market
forces were able to attain the maximum efficiency, there would
still exist a problem of equity in the distribution of the resources.
A democratic society may have a legitimate taste for
redistribution and for the implementation of a costly system of
safety nets; in this case the strict optimality notion delivered by
the free market ideology may not coincide with a broader notion
of social welfare.
But once we admit, because of “market failures”, the
impossibility to attain the first best equilibrium, the theory is
incapable of establishing an unique ranking of alternative
institutional arrangements. In other words, it has still to be
proven that efficiency is monotonically related to flexibility, so
that the closer we get to the benchmark, the better; and unless
this is proven, “more reforms are good” may not be seen as an
unconditionally true statement. Thus we have a first dismissal,
on theoretical grounds, of the argument in favour of structural
reforms.
If we broaden the perspective, things become even more
complex. I have argued elsewhere (Fitoussi, 2002, 2004) that
democracy and political adhesion of the population to the
economic government of a society can actually enhance efficiency,
guaranteeing the flexibility, transparency and consensus that
would be missing when ruling according to the strict application
of a doctrine
2. Take as an example the different bargaining power
of workers and entrepreneurs. In its “Wealth of Nations” Smith
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2 The path breaking research on the subject is USHER D. (1981).had already highlighted the problems that this asymmetry could
cause. The norms on labour protection can then be seen as a
legitimate outcome of the democratic process, aimed at re-
establishing some fairness in the bargaining process.
The only candidate left, for arguing in favour of structural
reforms, is then empirical analysis. Nickell et Al. (2003) who are
rather representative of the current consensus on the issue claim
that “the equilibrium level of unemployment is affected first by
any variables which influences the ease with which unemployed
individuals can be matched to available job vacancies, and second,
by any variable which tend to raise wages in a direct fashion
despite excess supply in the labour market”. These variables
include the unemployment benefit system, the real interest rate,
employment protection, active labour market policy, union
structures, the extent of coordination in wage bargaining, labour
taxes etc. But in fact what is striking is the weak, to say the least,
explanatory power of the institutional variables, especially those
supposedly more important, as the benefit replacement rate and
employment protection. That the latter may have ambiguous
effects has long been recognized in the literature: the fact that
firms are more cautious about hiring, because of strong labour
protection, may increase the efficiency of the matching process.
But what has not been recognized is that the same may be said
for the workers. The fact that unemployment benefit allows the
unemployed to search for a job better suited to their skills and
expectations, may also increase the efficiency of the matching
process. Certainly labour productivity could be greater if the
worker has the feeling that his job better corresponds to his desire
(Fitoussi, 2003).
At best, empirical studies are able to find robust second order
effects of institutions: “The estimated coefficients on labour
institutions disappear or becomes statistically insignificant when
the researchers make modest changes in the measures of
institutions, countries covered, and time periods of analysis”
(Freeman, 2005, p. 9). Economic outcomes are more easily
explained by the large shocks that OECD countries have suffered:
changing trend in productivity growth, the oil shocks, the
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reforms in the countries which implemented them, do not appear
to have played an important role either (Fitoussi et al., 2000).
There is thus a hiatus between usual recommendations and the
weaknesses of the evidence to support them.
This hiatus has been recognized in a recent, fascinating book
by the World Bank – Economic Growth in the 1990s: Learning from
a Decade of Reform (2005). This book is a plea for modesty about
what we know and what we do not, about the absence of a unique
universal set of rules, about the fallacy of the search for elusive
best practices, etc.
To  sum up, the assumption that the market paradigm is
always superior to any other institutional arrangement, is not
supported by a strong theoretical argument, nor by the data. As
Solow remarks at the end of his Keynes Lectures: “If pure
unadulterated labour-market reform is unlikely to create a
substantial increase in employment, then the main reason for
doing it is anticipated gain in productive efficiency, however large
that may be. But if we respect the wage earner’s desire for job
security, and it seems at least as respectable as anyone’s desire for
fast cars or fat-free desserts, then an improvement in productive
efficiency gained that way is not a Pareto-improvement. More
labour market flexibility may still be worth having — and I think
it is — but then the losers have a claim in equity to some
compensation. The trick is to find a form of compensation that
does not cancel the initial gain in labour-market flexibility”.
(Solow, 2002). On the empirical front, two recent studies
independently conducted on the subject
3, reached the same
conclusion out of a sample of 19 OECD countries. In market
democracies, the institutional structure is not a powerful factor
in explaining economic performance. Capitalism is sufficiently
robust to accommodate rather different institutional settings
(Freeman, 2000). If we had in each decade followed a common
wisdom saying that there is one institutional arrangement that is
best, we would have recommended to follow the French
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3 See FITOUSSI J.P. - PASSET O. (2000) and FREEMAN R.B. (2000).institutional model in the ’60s, the Japanese one in the ’70s, the
German one in the ’80s, and the US one in the ’90s. The nationality
of the model of the present decade is still unknown, although the
Danish one is gaining voices.
The diversity of the institutional framework in OECD
countries shows that institutions are the outcome of a political
process anchored in the specific history, culture and anthropology
of the country, rather than a way to increase efficiency. If for
example, the typical labour contract which emerged after the
World War II was almost everywhere of long duration, it may be
just because after a war, the solidarity between social groups had
to be reassessed. It may well be that, as I suggested before, the
social norm has since then evolved; but this only adds to the
evidence that the notion of “best” institution is endogenous
4.
5. - A Complementary Explanation: “Public Social Custom”
as a Determinant of Macroeconomic Policy in Europe
Before concluding we are left with another question that we
need to answer, in order to validate our hypothesis. In fact the
policy inertia and the push towards structural reforms were a
common characteristic of European policy-making, regardless of
the political side of the government involved. Is it possible that
any government in Europe has pushed an agenda aimed at
reducing the generosity of the social system? Why would
governments that had programs centred on growth and social
solidarity take a different course once elected, even when they had
a reasonable expectation of being punished by their electorate?
Unless this paradox is accounted for, our working hypothesis will
not hold. Fitoussi and Saraceno (2002) discuss this issue in
relation with the Stability and Growth Pact. The question they ask
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4 Take an example closer in time. The increased generosity of unemployment
benefits, after the attacks of September 11th, was quite obviously an adaptation
of institutions to the changed economic conditions. Yet, a supporter of  structural
reforms could argue ten years from now that unemployment had risen in response
to the increased rigidity of the system!is why governments have accepted restrictions to their fiscal
behaviour, when the economic debate on the rationale of
restrictions is still unsettled both theoretically and empirically. In
the framework of EMU, the question is all the more important
because national governments in the Union have few instruments
left, having already given up monetary sovereignty, i.e. the
manipulation of the exchange rate and the short term rate of
interest. A common monetary policy has differentiated effects on
the dynamics of public debt: countries “enjoying” the lowest rate
of inflation will suffer from the highest level of real interest rate;
as a consequence, it is particularly difficult to understand the
rationale of the policy mix which will be imposed by a strict
obedience to the Stability Pact. And even harder it is proving,
nowadays, to explain to the electorate and to public opinion why
the generalized stagnation of these years is not being dealt with
by means of a robust active fiscal policy.
There is for sure a path dependency in the building of Europe
which may explain why rules devised at a certain moment of time
under special circumstances — for example to convince the
German government to give up its monetary leadership in
exchange of an insurance of prudent fiscal behaviour — may
persist even when these special circumstances have disappeared.
It is important to underline that, whatever the context in which
they are designed, these kinds of rules, because they have to be
explained to an internal political audience and to be agreed upon
by other governments should have at least two properties: to be
simple and to be associated with a principle of good government.
Hence whence they are (loudly) legislated, it becomes very difficult
to call for their change without appearing as derogating to a
principle of good government. This is especially true of fiscal rules
because of the common wisdom according to which fiscal
discipline, whichever the expression means, is always the sign of
a good management. If the rule enters into force at a moment
where it is not binding — because growth is resuming as it was
the case in Europe — it acquires more strength and legitimacy.
That would not have been the case if the rule were impossible to
implement from the outset. Then any departure from the rule,
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lack of courage, demagogy, etc. Graders are given to the members’
state in the European class room and the mauvais élèves are
publicly designed (early warning, etc.). What is then at stake is
the reputation of the different governments both vis-à-vis their
electorate (and the opposition being in the left or in the right side
is prompt to denounce deviations from the rule in the public
debate) and their alter ego.
Hence we argue that the consideration of reputation issues
may go a long way to solve this puzzle. First, decisions concerning
the Union are the outcome of a bargaining process between the
different governments of Europe. Each government may believe
that its weight in the negotiations depends on its reputation. In a
similar vein, one may consider the European Union as a Club
were members obey a social norm because they believe that failing
in doing so will result in exclusion by the others; then, the
obedience to the norm may emerge as a self fulfilling equilibrium
void of any economic premise (but with serious consequences).
The paper extends to public behaviour a model originally written
by Akerlof (1980), and shows that the fear for reputation loss may
be enough to yield an inefficient equilibrium
5.
In a broader sense, this argument can also be used for the
purpose of this paper. A newly elected government, regardless of
its political colour and mandate, must show to its EU partners
that it is in fact worthy of sitting at the table. As a consequence,
it will adhere to the mainstream agenda regardless of its
convenience and of the electorate preferences. Paradoxically,
governments whose constituencies care more about the social
contract, will be those who must work harder to convince the
partners, pushing the reforms aimed at dismantling the contract
itself.
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5 The Stability Pact is not the only instance of a norm constraining public
behaviour in recent European history. In the 1990s, the obedience to the
theoretically dubious requirement of maintaining exchange rate parities vis-à-vis
the German Mark had most of the features of a social norm. It led to a strongly
procyclical monetary policy, similar in many respects to the widely studied (CLARKE
S., 1967) British experience of the 1920s. As a result, Europe entered a period of
slow growth and mounting unemployment that lasted almost six years.Of course, one may wonder why reputation is founded on
criteria of budget balance, and not on criteria of low
unemployment or high GDP growth. And the answer is most
probably to be traced to a sort of path dependency. The transition
towards the EMU has been dominated by the Maastricht criteria;
it is now plainly admitted, even by high rank officials, that the
criteria were motivated, among other things, by the attempt
(failed) to exclude from the Euro the so called “Club Med”
countries (Italy, Spain, Greece, Portugal). The norm that emerged
with non economical motivations is now trapping those who
wanted it, and has heavy welfare consequences for the Club as a
whole.
6. - Conclusion
The main purpose of this paper was to understand the course
of macroeconomic policy in Europe in the light of several analyses
which have shown that it has barely adapted to the different
shocks which have hit the European economy in the last two
decades. As a result the performance of the EU economy in the
last 15 years and in particular the euro area have been poor,
slightly but just slightly better than the Japanese economy (almost
the same real growth per capita during this period in the two
regions). The usual diagnosis of this situation is the structural
sickness of the European economy in general and of its big
continental countries in particular: too high a level of
redistribution through both the social protection system and the
fiscal system; too high a level of labour protection; too many
obstacles to a smooth functioning of a market economy both in
the labour and the good markets. It is nearly obvious that if all
these reforms are implemented the most likely outcome would be
an increase in the degree of inequality in European societies. This
increase would be the social cost to pay for adapting to a new
context, and notably to globalisation and the new information and
communication technology. This adaptation will deliver great
economic benefits even if unevenly distributed.
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system has to be adapted to change in its environment. But it
contains also a lot of rhetoric at least for two reasons. The first
is that, despite the numerous efforts deployed to prove it
empirically, there still does not exist strong empirical evidence to
validate it. The second is that it has been possible to prove that
the most globalised economies (i.e. small countries) have, contrary
to common wisdom, big government. 
But common beliefs, whatever their theoretical and empirical
underpinning, act as social norms. It is why I have advanced the
working hypothesis that a change in social norms may explain the
course of macroeconomic policies in Europe — their non
reactivity to unemployment and/or soft growth — if we admit that
their implicit aim is to show that the only way out are structural
reforms to adapt to the new social norm. Otherwise we would
have been left with the puzzle that the need for structural reforms
is an excuse for bad macroeconomic policies.
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